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Federal Tort Claims Act: Liability of United States for
Torts Committed in Good Faith by Federal Law
Enforcement Officers
On March 15, 1975, the Alexandria, Virginia, Police Department
was informed by an anonymous telephone caller that Patricia Hearst
and another fugitive might be living in a local apartment.' The police
contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation,2 which assigned four
agents to investigate the tip.3 Without securing a search warrant,' the
law enforcement officers sought admittance to the apartment. The
occupant, Elizabeth Ann Norton, refused to open the door and the
agents attempted to enter by force. Fearing that the door would be
destroyed, Norton unlatched the lock. The four agents entered with
weapons drawn and searched the apartment, but no evidence of the
fugitives was discovered. Norton, alleging a violation of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution,' brought suit against
1. Patricia Campbell Hearst, twenty-year-old heiress of the Hearst publishing
empire, was kidnapped by a radical group called the Symbionese Liberation Army in
February 1974. Two months after her abduction, she apparently became a member of
the group and was sought for her participation in two robberies. She was captured in
September 1975, was convicted of armed bank robbery and illegal use of a firearm,
and served a two-year prison term. See generally TE TmAL oF PArr HEAnT (1976)
(trial transcript of United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976)).
2. The anonymous call was received by the Alexandria Police dispatcher at 8:13
p.m. on Saturday evening and was immediately relayed to the local office of the FBI,
where it was recorded as follows:
You know Patty Hearst is supposed to be in Pennsylvania but she's not.
She's currently at 649 Notabene Drive, Apartment #10, in Alexandria and
she's been there for the last week or ten days. She's cut her hair and she's
with one of the people who left with her from California.
Stipulation of Uncontested Facts, Joint Appendix, at 26, Norton v. United States,
581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Appendix].
3. The federal agents arrived at the Alexandria Police Department about an hour
after the tip had been received. Using the telephone company locator, they incorrectly
identified the occupant of the apartment as Victor Harry Evol. The four federal agents,
two local detectives, and two uniformed policemen then met near the building, where
the FBI agents furnished the officers with photographs, physical descriptions, and
information describing the fugitives. The agents were equipped with revolvers, shot-
guns, and tear gas. The building was observed for 30 minutes prior to the forced entry
at 10:00 p.m. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 27-32.
4. No attempt was made to obtain a search warrant for the apartment. A federal
warrant for the arrest of Patricia Hearst was in effect at the time. Id. at 29.
5. It was later discovered that the tip was a hoax, and the tipster was identified
as a disgruntled neighbor in the building. Id. at 33.
6. The fourth amendment to the Constitution reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
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the individual law enforcement officers7 and against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).1 On cross motions
for summary judgment, the district court held that there had been a
violation of plaintiff's fourth amendment rights, but that the individ-
ual officers and agents were entitled to prove their good faith as a
defense to personal monetary liability.9 The court granted summary
judgment against the United States, however, holding that the
United States was not entitled to assert the good faith of its agents
as a defense to federal liability. 10 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed on the issue of
the availability of the good faith defense to the United States, holding
that the liability of the United States under the FTCA is coterminous
with that of its agents. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978).
Liability of state and federal governments for the acts of their
agents has traditionally been avoided by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, under which a person may not sue the sovereign without
its consent." In 1946, however, Congress enacted the Federal Tort
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Plaintiff brought suit against the federal agents under the rule of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See text accompanying note 19
infra.
Plaintiff also brought suit against the local police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) for violation of her civil rights. Norton also asserted pendant state common law
claims of assault, trespass, and false imprisonment. Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp.
138, 149 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003
(1978).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
9. Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 152 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972); text accompanying note 20 infra. The good faith
defense is available in suits alleging constitutional tort injury against local police offi-
cers under § 1983 as well as in suits against federal officers brought under the rule of
Bivens. See Butz v. Economu, 438 U.S. 478, 484 (1978).
10. Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 152 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978). After a separate hearing on the extent
of damages, the court entered judgment against the United States in the amount of
$12,500. Plaintiff then dismissed her claims against the individual defendants. Joint
Appendix, supra note 2, at 87, 89.
11. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity was based on the premise
that "the King can do no wrong." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 254. "Just how
an immunity which had its roots in feudalism and in a political philosophy associated
with the divine rights of kings was transplanted to the new republic in America re-
mains something of a mystery." F. JAMES & F. HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.2, at
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Claims Act, 12 which made the federal government liable for damages
"for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful" conduct of a federal employee "acting
within the scope of his office or employment." 3 The doctrine of sover-
1609 (1956). Indeed, the doctrine of sovereign immunity finds no basis in the United
States Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Commentators
have suggested that the origin and development of sovereign immunity in American
law was based on judicial misunderstanding of English law and on the precarious
economic situation in the new union of states. See generally Boger, Gitenstein &
Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpreta-
tive Analysis, 54 N.C. L. Rv. 497, 508 (1976). Borchard, Governmental Responsibility
in Tort: VII, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577, 734 (1928); Borchard, Governmental Responsibil-
ity in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927); Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental
Units, 40 MINN. L. Rav. 751 (1956); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Governmental
Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 610 (1955).
Whatever its origin, the American judiciary has traditionally supported the notion
that "there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). See Davis,
supra, at 753. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974); Hill v. United
States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
286, 288 (1846); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-18 (1821).
12. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was enacted as title IV of the Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842, and codified by the
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 1346(b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1976)).
Prior to passage of the FTCA, Congress had twice acted to limit the reach of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. The passage of the Court of Claims Act in 1855 was the
first concession made against the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Act of Feb. 24,
1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, as amended by Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 7, 12
Stat. 765 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-174, 2519 (1976)). The Tucker Act of
March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a),
1491 (1976)), provided a remedy in contractual areas. Beyond these two pieces of leg-
islation, an individual could seek redress for a harm suffered as a result of federal
action only through the passage of a private bill through Congress. This remedy even-
tually proved to be too costly. "The volume of these private bills, the inadequacy of
congressional machinery for determination of facts, the importunities to which claim-
ants subjected members of Congress, and the capricious results, led to a strong de-
mand that claims for tort wrongs be submitted to adjudication." Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950). The FTCA, which became law after nearly thirty
years of legislative consideration, was a result of both the crush of private bills and
the "feeling that the Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for
the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work." Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The existence and scope of federal liability was
to be determined in "accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." Id. The statute was originally written with the intent not to create new
substantive law, but to incorporate the rules of liability of the place where the accident
occurred. H.R. RaP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1942).
1979] 1295
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
eign immunity was retained, however, as a defense to intentional-tort
claims. 4
In 1974, the FTCA was amended to extend coverage to claims
arising out of "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
abuse of process, or malicious prosecution" by "investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government."'" The Senate
Report accompanying the 1974 amendment stated that Congress also
intended to waive sovereign immunity with respect to claims'6 such
as those in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. '7 The plaintiff in
Bivens brought an action against six federal narcotics agents, alleging
that the agents violated his fourth amendment rights when they con-
ducted a warrantless search of his apartment.'8 In reversing the lower
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) (amended 1974) excluded "[a]ny claim arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights." There are a number of other exceptions to the coverage generally provided
by the act. These include claims arising from negligent transmission of letters, id.
§ 2680(b), claims arising from quarantine, id. § 2680(f), claims arising from combatant
activities of military forces during war, id. § 2680(j), and claims based on an act or
omission by a government employee exercising due care in performing a discretionary
function. Id. § 2680(a).
15. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1976)). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) reads:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to -
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepre-
sentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with
regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the
United States Government, the provision of this chapter and section 1346(b)
of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the
enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this
subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of
the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize
evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
16. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
5881, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2789, 2791 states that
this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its
progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to
make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of
conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case
imposes liability upon the individual Government officials involved).
S. REP. No. 588, supra, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2791.
17. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
18. The facts of the Bivens case were summarized by Justice Brennan as follows:
This case has its origin in an arrest and search carried out on the morn-
ing of November 26, 1965. Petitioner's complaint alleged that on that day
respondents, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics acting under claim
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court's dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, the Supreme Court held
that the Constitution created an implied right to damages against
individual federal officers found to have conducted an illegal search. 9
The Supreme Court in Bivens did not consider the issue of
whether the federal officers might plead their good faith as a de-
fense to Bivens' charges. On remand, however, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an officer violating a person's constitu-
tional rights is not liable in damages if he can demonstrate "not only
that he believed, in good faith, that his conduct was lawful, but also
that his belief was reasonable."0 This good faith defense still has
not been explicitly approved by the Supreme Court. The defense,
however, has been uniformly accepted by other courts" despite
widespread criticism of the doctrine.Y
Neither the 1974 amendment to the FTCA21 nor the Senate Re-
port accompanying the amendment explicitly addressed the issue of
whether the good faith defense defeats claims made under the FTCA.
of federal authority, entered his apartment and arrested him for alleged
narcotics violations. The agents manacled petitioner in front of his wife and
children, and threatened to arrest the entire family. They searched the
apartment from stem to stem. Thereafter, petitioner was taken to the federal
courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected
to a visual strip search.
Id. at 389.
19. The cause of action for damages against federal officers has been broadened
in subsequent cases to include not only violations of fourth amendment rights, but also
rights under the first amendment, Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975);
Farber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1973), and the sixth amendment. Johnston
v. National Broadcasting Co., 356 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
20. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
21. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011,1015 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); Ervin v. Ciccone, 557 F.2d 1260, 1262 (8th Cir. 1977);
Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1976); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d
1376, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1975); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Tritsis
v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 1974); Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374, 1376
(4th Cir. 1973); Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 604-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 953 (1973); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 593 (D. Minn. 1973).
22. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 460-62 (1978);
Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations of Individual Rights,
59 MINN. L. Rav. 991, 1008-09 (1975); Note, Accountability for Government Miscon-
duct: Limiting Qualified Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEM'. L.Q. 938,
951-55 (1976).
23. "The plain language of the amendment offers no clue as to congressional
intent with regard to the scope of the government's liability. Indeed, reading only the
amendment itself, one might even question its applicability to the federal tort created




In Norton, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found con-
trolling a passage in the Senate Report that stated that the amend-
ment was intended to make "the Government independently liable
in damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have
occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the
individual Government officials involved)."" This statement, the
court reasoned, suggests an intent to limit governmental liability to
"only . . .those cases where individual liability would lie under
Bivens." 1 The conclusion that the amendment was intended to apply
only in situations strictly analogous to Bivens, the court stated, was
further supported by the Senate Report's focus on creating a remedy
for intentional, outrageous, and abusive conduct." Thus, the court
concluded, a fair reading of the Senate Report mandates that federal
liability is "inextricably tied" to individual liability.Y
Other parts of the legislative history, however, support a conclu-
sion contrary to that reached by the court. For example, Senator
Percy, a sponsor of the 1974 amendment, expressed his concern that
the Bivens remedy is "severely limited by the ease with which agents
can usually establish the defense of having acted in good faith." In
addition, the staff of the Senate committee responsible for the 1974
amendment2 ' explicitly stated in a memorandum, "Congress does not
oppose . . .the assertion of defenses of good faith and reasonable
belief in the validity of the search and arrest on behalf of individual
government defendants, so long as it is understood that the govern-
24. 581 F.2d at 395. See note 16 supra.
25. 581 F.2d at 395.
26. Id. at 396. The Senate Report's focus on clearly illegal conduct is demon-
strated by its reference to the Bivens case. S. REP. No. 588, supra note 16, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2791. In addition, the 1974 amendment
appears to be a direct consequence of hearings conducted by Senator Percy, a sponsor
of the amendment. These hearings investigated several ill-advised and highly publi-
cized drug raids in Collinsville, Illinois, conducted by Drug Abuse Law Enforcement
(DALE), during which armed agents subjected two innocent families to nighttime
invasions. See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 11, at 500-01.
27. 581 F.2d at 396.
28. S. REP. No. 469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973) (individual views of Senator
Percy). This comment appears borne out by the Collinsville example. In none of the
civil actions arising from the DALE drug raids, see note 26 supra, has a plaintiff
received a damage award. Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976). Reply Brief
for the Appellant at 7, 8, Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1003 (1978). In one case, a directed verdict was awarded defendant agents.
Meiners v. Moriarity, 563 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. The Senate Committee on Governmental Operations was considering a drug
law enforcement agency bill when Senator Sam Ervin, Chairman of the committee,
added the amendment to the FTCA. See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 11,
at 516-17.
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ment's liability is not coterminous with that of the individual defen-
dants."31
The Norton court discounted the countervailing legislative his-
tory with the statement that "[w]hat must guide us is not Senator
Percy's intent nor the intent of the committee staff, but rather the
intent of the Congress."'3 Since the intent of Congress is nowhere
made explicit, however, the court's treatment of this aspect of the
legislative history is unsatisfactory. Moreover, still other passages in
the Senate Report can be construed to support a broader definition
of liability.32 In light of the inconsistencies in the legislative history
of the 1974 amendment, the Norton court's decision on the basis of
congressional intent is unsatisfying.
In the absence of an explicit statement of polic, in the 1974
amendments, the Norton court would also have been justified in
adopting a broader, policy-oriented analysis. Indeed, the Norton
court appeared to take an initial step toward a more comprehensive
analysis by invoking the general policy that statutes waiving sover-
eign immunity and imposing a potentially burdensome impact on the
federal treasury are to be strictly construed.- The court, however,
30. Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, Memorandum on "No-
Knock" Legislation, August 28, 1973, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 86.
One commentator has stated that the memorandum was the definitive statement of
legislative intent:
On one point, however, the Senate committees were clearly insistent on
distinguishing their recommendation from prior law. The federal govern-
ment was not to be allowed to escape liability under the new statute by
retreating behind various "defenses" that had been created under Bivens or
section 1983 . . . . Thus, despite the constant reference in legislative docu-
ments to Bivens and section 1983, the proposed federal liability was meant
to differ in this very crucial aspect from its historical analogues.
Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 11, at 515 (footnotes omitted).
31. 581 F.2d at 396.
32. For example, the Senate Report states that the United States should be
subject to liability "whenever its agents act under color of law so as to injure the public
through search and seizures that are conducted without warrants or with warrants
issued without probable cause." S. REP. No. 588, supra note 16, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2791 (emphasis added). See also Norton v. Turner,
427 F. Supp. 138, 149-50 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1003 (1978).
33. 581 F.2d at 396-97 (citing McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951)).
That case, involving the statute of limitations in the Suits in Admiralty Act, stated in
dicta that "[w]hile . . . legislation for the benefit of seamen is to be construed liber-
ally in their favor, it is equally true that statutes which waive immunity of the United
States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign." Id. at 27
(footnotes omitted). Clearly McMahon might also be read to support liberal construc-
tion to effectuate the statutory remedy. Interestingly, the Norton court also quoted
Justice Frankfurter's admonition to the judiciary not to view its role as a "self-
constituted guardian of the Treasury [importing] immunity back into a statute de-
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neglected to weigh the policy in favor of protection of the federal
fisc against the magnitude of the injury Congress intended to remedy.
As the Bivens court commented:
The mere invocation of federal power by a federal law enforcement
official will normally render futile any attempt to resist an unlawful
entry or arrest by resort to the local police; and a claim of authority
to enter is likely to unlock the door as well . . . "In such cases
there is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of the
judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by the officers
of the government, professing to act in its name. There remains to
him but the alternative of resistance, which may amount to
crime."u
Norton illustrates the type of harm the 1974 FTCA amendment seeks
to redress: a violation of a fundamental fourth amendment right,
committed by a federal agent,n to which the individual, as a practical
matter, must submit. A citizen who has suffered from illegal police
action gains little solace from the knowledge that the offending officer
was acting in good faith and with a reasonable but mistaken belief
in the legality of the action. When analysis is focused on the plight
of the injured citizen, it becomes reasonable to subject the federal
government to liability for proven constitutional injury caused by its
agents, without regard to the subtleties of the officer's state of mind.'
signed to limit it." 581 F.2d at 397 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61, 69 (1955)).
34. 403 U.S. at 394-95 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219 (1882)).
35. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977),
modified on other grounds, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978) (the fact that it is a government
agent who violates a citizen's constitutional rights is an aggravating, not a mitigating,
factor).
36. In discussing an action against state police for violation of constitutional
rights, Judge Newman commented as follows:
This is not to suggest that either the Constitution or section 1983 establishes
strict liability, in the sense of an entitlement to compensation whenever
injury is sustained. The standards of the Constitution, notably those of the
Fourth Amendment, already contain a sufficient element of reasonableness
to avoid any possibility that law enforcement officers will become guarantors
of the liberty or well-being of those they apprehend. But these standards,
however flexible, ihould be enforced on their own terms, without further
dilution by common law defenses that evolved under a jurisprudence primar-
ily concerned with adjusting disputes between private individuals. Constitu-
tional standards, designed to limit governmental authority over citizens,
serve a more important function. If imposition of personal liability upon the
wrongdoer is thought to have consequences adverse to the proper discharge
of his public functions, society can either reimburse the wrongdoer or shift
liability to his employer, rather than deny a remedy to the victim. His
constitutional rights are just as impaired and the injury he suffers just as
serious regardless of the good faith of the wrongdoer.
Newman, supra note 22, at 462.
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A second policy consideration in favor of an expansive interpre-
tation of the FTCA amendment stems from the rationale underlying
the good faith defense. A functional analysis of the good faith defense
suggests that it serves two purposes. First, the defense protects the
individual officer from civil liability for honest and reasonable mis-
takes made in an effort to carry out the often difficult responsibilities
of public service." Law officers may be required to make on-the-spot
decisions that present difficult constitutional questions even for law-
yers and courts." The good faith defense apportions the risk of mis-
takes in that situation by comparing the individual officer's conduct
with that of a reasonable person." A second and related purpose of
the good faith defense is founded on the assumption that the threat
of a damage suit and the attendant risk of monetary loss may dis-
suade a federal officer from executing his duties "with the decisive-
ness and the judgment required by the public good."4 The good faith
defense thus promotes smooth governmental operations by affording
the well-meaning public servant a measure of protection.'
Extending the good faith defense to the United States, however,
is not justified by the policy considerations that justify applying it
to an individual officer. The greater financial resources of the federal
government protect it from judgments that might prove devastating
to an individual. In addition, since the threat of a damage suit
against the United States is not likely to have a chilling effect on the
willingness of an individual officer to act decisively, denying the de-
37. Typically, law enforcement officers have no personal insurance against dam-
age judgments. Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810-12
(1979). Police unions and municipalities, however, may provide insurance coverage,
id., and some jurisdictions provide indemnification. Newman, supra note 22, at 456.
38. See Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 830 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 866 (1971); Note, supra note 22, at 972, which states:
It happens to be the officer on the street or the prison guard or official who
has the greatest contact, under the most difficult circumstances and condi-
tions, with private citizens. These officials are enforcing mandated policy;
regardless of whether they go beyond the limits of their mandate, it is unfair
to force them to take the entire brunt of a sizeable judgment.
39. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348-49 (2d Cir.
1972) (Lumbard, J., concurring).
40. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974). See generally Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975); Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1332 (4th Cir.
1974).
41. The good faith defense may go beyond the proper measure of protection
necessary to facilitate effective law enforcement. A field research study of § 1983 suits
concludes that "the good faith defense should be eliminated from police misconduct
suits. To the extent that the doctrine affects jury verdicts, it is an added protection
for the police officer who already benefits from the biases of jurors." Project, supra note
37, at 815-16 (footnotes omitted). See also text accompanying note 28 supra.
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fense to the United States would not impair vigorous law enforce-
ment." Extension of the good faith defense to the United States is
not, therefore, supported by the rationales of the defense.
By contrast, reasons similar to those used to justify strict pro-
ducts liability justify holding the United States liable even though
the good faith defense would absolve the individual officer from lia-
bility." The risk that an individual will suffer a tortious injury at the
hands of federal agents is an inevitable and foreseeable consequence
of federal law enforcement activity. The costs of such injuries should,
therefore, be spread among all those sharing the benefits of an effec-
tive system of law enforcement." Large governmental units are, in-
deed,
the best of all possible loss spreaders . . . . This basic fact, which
so far has been given too little heed, will in time lead us to see that
the basis for government liability should not be fault but should be
equitable loss spreading. The ultimate principle may be that the
taxpaying public should usually bear the fortuitous and heavy losses
that result from governmental activity. The key idea will be neither
comparison with private liability in the same circumstances...
nor fault on the part of the governmental unit or its agents; the key
idea will be simply that a beneficent governmental unit ought not
to allow exceptional losses to be borne by those upon whom the
governmental activity has happened to inflict them."
The capacity of the federal government to meet the costs of an
injury caused by an exercise of governmental power and to spread
these costs among all those receiving the benefits of a system of law
enforcement justifies the view that federal liability provides a more
equitable way to apportion the costs of law enforcement activity.
42. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 998 (6th Cir. 1975).
43. See Project, supra note 37, at 816-17 n.195, which states:
The goals of a strict liability standard in products liability cases are (1) to
minimize danger to consumers, (2) to place the burden of loss on the manu-
facturer, who can best minimize the danger, and (3) to distribute the losses
equitably among the consuming public, as a cost of doing business. 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 28.16, at 1571 (1956). The goals of
a strict liability standard in police misconduct cases are comparable: (1) to
minimize unconstitutional acts, (2) to place costs on the municipality, which
can deter unconstitutional acts, and (3) to distribute the losses equitably
among the citizens of the municipality, who are the beneficiaries of police
protection.
44. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); F. HARPER & F.
JAmEs, supra note 11, § 29.1, at 1607-08; W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 131, at 978 (4th ed. 1971); Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MIcH.
L. REv. 201, 207 (1956); Jaffe, supra note 11, at 229-30.
45. Davis, supra note 11, at 811-12.
[Vol. 63:12931302
1979] FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1303
Nevertheless, the Norton court adopted an overly restrictive view
of federal liability for violations of constitutional rights committed
by federal law enforcement agents. The court relied on a narrow in-
terpretation of legislative history and did not give sufficient weight
to countervailing policy arguments. The rationale of the good faith
defense, the nature of the harm Congress sought to remedy, and the
risk-spreading capacity of the federal government suggest a result
contrary to that reached in Norton. By declining to consider these
policy arguments, the court failed to effectuate fully the remedial
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act.

